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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 14-1857 
 ___________ 
 
CHRISTOPHER J. WARE, 
        Appellant 
v. 
 
POLICE OFFICER TODD RILEY; 
POLICE OFFICER KIMBERLY DONAHUE 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the District of Delaware 
 (D.C. Civil Action No. 1-10-cv-00629) 
 District Judge:  Honorable Sue L. Robinson 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
October 1, 2014 
 
 Before:  FISHER, VANASKIE and GARTH, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion filed: October 8, 2014) 
 
 ___________  
 
 OPINION 
 ___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Christopher J. Ware appeals from the District Court’s entry of judgment in favor 
of the defendants following a bench trial.  We will affirm. 
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 Ware rented an apartment on the third floor of a home in Wilmington, Delaware.  
One night in July 2008 (the parties dispute which one, but that detail is not relevant to 
any issue on review), the Wilmington police department received a call from an alarm 
company notifying them that the burglar alarm at the residence had activated.  Officers 
Todd Riley, Kimberly Pfaff1 and Scott Gula responded and found the front door of the 
residence ajar.  Suspecting a burglary in progress, the officers entered the house and 
eventually reached Ware’s locked third-floor bedroom.   
 Ware was inside laying naked under a blanket on a mattress.  He heard the 
officers’ dispatch radios as they approached but did not announce his presence.  Riley 
and Pfaff eventually gained entry to Ware’s bedroom and required Ware to identify 
himself.  Ware claims that, after he already had done so twice, Riley asked him his name 
again and Ware declined to respond.  Ware further claims that Riley then knocked him to 
the ground by pressing his forearm against Ware’s neck in what he refers to as a “trachea 
hold.”  Riley denies that he did so.  Ware also claims that Pfaff rifled through his 
business card holder after he already handed her his driver’s license and that, although he 
asked for permission to dress several times, the officers ignored him and he remained 
naked for the duration of this encounter.  Pfaff disputes both accounts. 
                                                 
1 This officer is identified as Kimberly Donahue in the complaint, but she apparently has 
since taken the last name Pfaff.  The District Court and the parties refer to her as Pfaff, 
and we will do the same. 
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 Ware filed suit pro se against Riley and Pfaff under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging, 
inter alia, that they entered his bedroom and seized him, that Riley used excessive force, 
and that Pfaff searched his business card holder, all in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment.  Following discovery and summary judgment proceedings, the District 
Court conducted a bench trial2 and later entered judgment in favor of the defendants.  
Ware appeals, and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
II. 
 By our count, Ware raises some eighteen claims of trial error and also challenges, 
in addition to the final judgment, ten of the District Court’s pre-trial rulings.  Each of 
Ware’s challenges lacks merit.3 
A.     The Merits of Ware’s Claims 
 Ware raises challenges directed to the District Court’s judgment on his four 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
2 Ware asserts for the first time in his reply brief that he intended to demand a jury trial 
and believed he had done so.  He does not argue even there, however, that the District 
Court erred in conducting a bench trial.  To the contrary, he concedes that he did not 
properly demand a jury trial and he does not claim that he ever objected to proceeding 
with a bench trial in the District Court. 
 
3 Following a bench trial, we review the District Court’s findings of fact only for clear 
error but review legal issues de novo.  See In re Frescati Shipping Co., Ltd., 718 F.3d 
184, 196 (3d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1279 (2014).  We review for abuse of 
discretion the District Court’s ruling on discovery matters, case management, and matter 
of evidence, though we exercise plenary review to the extent that evidentiary rulings 
involve an interpretation of the Federal Rules of Evidence.  See ZF Meritor, LLC v. 
Eaton Corp., 696 F.3d 254, 268 (3d Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2025 (2013). 
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substantive claims.  First, Ware claims that the officers unlawfully entered his bedroom.  
The District Court concluded that the entry was lawful because the officers had probable 
cause to believe that a burglary was in progress and a burglary in progress triggers the 
exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement.  See United States v. 
Mallory, — F.3d —, No. 13-2025, 2014 WL 4347198, at *8 (3d Cir. Sept. 3, 2014) 
(“Warrantless searches of the home are presumptively unreasonable unless the occupants 
consent or probable cause and exigent circumstances exist to justify the intrusion.”) 
(quotation marks omitted).  In particular, the District Court concluded that it was 
reasonable for the officers to suspect that a burglar was in Ware’s bedroom because the 
burglar alarm had sounded, the front door stood ajar, there was no one else in the house, 
Ware’s bedroom door was locked, and no one therein identified themselves when the 
officers knocked and announced.4 
 Ware concedes that the officers were justified in entering the house itself, and he 
does not challenge the District Court’s conclusion that a burglary in progress can 
constitute an exigent circumstance.  See, e.g., United States v. McCullough, 457 F.3d 
1150, 1164 (10th Cir. 2006) (noting that other Courts of Appeals “unanimously agree . . . 
that . . . the exigent circumstances exception [applies] when the officer reasonably 
                                                 
4 Ware contends that the officers did not knock and announce, but both Riley and Pfaff 
testified that they did (ECF No. 94, N.T. 11/20/13, at 143; ECF No. 95, N.T. 11/21/13, at 
189), and the District Court did not clearly err in relying on that testimony.  See Mallory, 
2014 WL 4347198, at *7 (adopting standard of review for claims of exigent 
circumstances). 
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believes a burglary is in progress”).  Instead, he argues that the District Court failed to 
resolve Riley’s and Pfaff’s allegedly differing accounts of how the officers gained entry 
to his bedroom.  He also argues that Pfaff’s testimony that they may have done so by 
picking the lock instead of kicking down the door is inconsistent with exigency.   
 Riley’s and Pfaff’s testimony on this point, however, did not actually conflict.  
Riley testified that the officers “forcibly entered the room” and may have “kicked [the 
door] or pushed against it” but that “I don’t remember exactly how.”  (ECF No. 94, N.T. 
11/20/13, at 144.)  Pfaff testified that she too did not remember exactly how the officers 
gained entry but that it was possible one of them may have “manipulated the door 
without forcing it.”  (ECF No. 95, N.T. 11/21/13, at 205.)  Riley did not testify that the 
officers actually kicked down the door as Ware alleges, and Riley’s testimony that the 
officers may have pushed against the door does not contradict Pfaff’s testimony that they 
may have manipulated the lock.  Nor are we persuaded that exigency necessarily would 
have required them to immediately kick down the door before attempting to gain entry in 
some other way. 
 Second, Ware claims that the officers’ seizure of him in his room was 
unreasonable because he was naked the entire time.  The District Court acknowledged 
that, even if there is probable cause for a seizure, special consideration is required when 
the seizure is “conducted in an extraordinary manner, unusually harmful to an 
individual’s privacy.”  Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 818 (1996).  The District 
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Court concluded that the seizure was reasonable because, inter alia, Ware was in his room 
and shielded from public view, he was not made to strip but merely to remain as he was, 
and the overall encounter lasted for a short period of time.   
 Ware’s sole challenge to this ruling is that the District Court did not resolve the 
conflict between his testimony that officers would not let him dress until the end of the 
encounter (ECF No. 94, N.T. 11/20/13, at 89, 94-95) and Pfaff’s testimony that she 
allowed Ware to dress because she never allows a suspect to “stand around naked while 
[she is] conducting an investigation” (ECF No. 95, N.T. 11/21/13, at 190).  It is true that 
the District Court noted this conflict without expressly resolving it, but it was not 
necessary to do so.  Even if the District Court had accepted Ware’s version of events, 
Ware testified that he remained naked only (1) while police questioned him in his room, 
(2) during a brief call to his landlord, and (3) while an officer went to a neighbor’s 
residence to verify his identity, which verification Ware testified took “a short time . . . I 
would say between five and ten minutes.”  (ECF No. 94, N.T. 11/20/13, at 93.)  Thus, it 
was not clearly erroneous for the District Court to conclude that Ware remained naked 
only for a short period of time.  Ware does not argue that the District Court erred in 
relying on that factor (or any other), and we cannot say that it did.  Cf. L.A. Cnty. v. 
Rettele, 550 U.S. 609, 614 (2007) (holding a search reasonable where police ordered 
naked couple out of bed at gunpoint and they remained naked for two or three minutes). 
 Third, Ware claims that Pfaff unreasonably searched his business card holder for 
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identification after he already handed her his driver’s license.  Pfaff, by contrast, testified 
that Ware refused to identify himself and that she searched the holder (which she referred 
to as a wallet) for his driver’s license only thereafter.  (ECF No/ 95, N.T. 11/21/13, at 
191-92.)  The District Court concluded that Pfaff’s search for identification was 
reasonable because Ware refused to reveal his identity and that, even if the search was 
unreasonable, the call was close enough that Pfaff was entitled to qualified immunity.   
 Ware raises no challenge to the second of these rulings.  As to the first, he argues 
that the District Court’s finding is inconsistent with the alleged admission in 
“defendants’” answer that he voluntarily handed Pfaff his driver’s license before she 
searched his card holder.  (Appellant’s Br. at 11.)  But the answer he refers to is Riley’s 
(ECF No. 9), not Pfaff’s, and Riley testified that he did not see Pfaff search the card 
holder (ECF No. 94, N.T. 11/20/13, at 148).  In Pfaff’s answer, she admitted that she 
“took possession of Plaintiff’s driver’s license,” not that he voluntarily handed it to her.  
(ECF No. 61 at 2, ¶ 8.)  That admission is fully consistent with her testimony and the 
District Court’s findings.  Ware also argues that the officers could have ascertained his 
identity from pieces of mail that were in plain view.  Ware offered no evidence to that 
effect, however, and items of mail bearing his name would not necessarily have identified 
him as a lawful occupant of the apartment in any event.  See United States v. Johnson, 9 
F.3d 506, 509 (6th Cir. 1993).  
 Finally, Ware claims that Riley used excessive force by knocking him to the 
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ground when Ware refused to state his name.  Ware testified to that effect at trial.  (ECF 
No. 94, N.T. 11/20/13, at 94.)  Riley, by contrast, flatly denied that he even touched Ware 
and testified that there was “no use of force.”  (Id. at 149, 151.)  Ware’s primary 
argument on this claim is that the District Court failed to make a credibility determination 
or otherwise resolve this factual dispute.  We disagree. 
 District courts “must find facts specially” following a bench trial, Fed. R. Civ. P. 
52(a)(1), but we generally deem findings insufficient under this rule only when they fail 
to provide a “clear understanding of the basis of the decision,” In re Frescati Shipping 
Co., Ltd., 718 F.3d 184, 196 (3d Cir. 2013) (quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 134 
S. Ct. 1279 (2014).  And although district courts generally “should make determinations 
of witness credibility where appropriate,” EBC, Inc. v. Clark Bldg. Sys., Inc., 618 F.3d 
253, 273 (3d Cir. 2010), such determinations may be implied, see Tracinda Corp. v. 
DaimlerChrysler AG, 502 F.3d 212, 245 (3d Cir. 2007).  In this case, it is clear from the 
District Court’s opinion, particularly when viewed in the context of the proceeding as a 
whole, that the District Court deemed Riley’s testimony more credible than Ware’s and 
found that the alleged use of force did not occur. 
 At closing, defense counsel argued that Ware’s testimony was not credible 
because, inter alia, it was not corroborated by any evidence and the evidence instead 
supported Riley’s testimony that he did not use force.  In particular, defense counsel 
argued that Ware’s testimony was not credible because he did not file a formal complaint 
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against Riley, the officers did not file a use-of-force report, and Ware did not require any 
medical treatment.  (ECF No. 95, N.T. 11/21/13, at 244-45, 247.)  Then, in its 
conclusions of law, the District Court wrote: 
Plaintiff testified that force was used after he refused to answer Riley’s 
question about his identity.  Riley flatly denies that he touched plaintiff.  
The court finds plaintiff failed to meet his burden of proof on the issue that 
it is more likely than not that Riley used excessive force.  There is no 
evidence of any injury to plaintiff and plaintiff did not seek medical 
attention.  Nor was there a use-of-force investigation [by the police 
department] which is standard procedure when force is used by police 
officers.  Finally, plaintiff testified that he did not seek medical attention 
and did not file a citizen’s complaint regarding Riley’s actions. 
 
(ECF No. 96, Dist. Ct. Op. at 15 ¶ 34.)  This reasoning closely tracks defense counsel’s 
argument. 
 Moreover, the District Court recognized in denying Riley’s motion for summary 
judgment on this claim that, if it found that Riley used force, then it would have to 
determine whether the use of force was excessive under the factors set forth in Graham v. 
Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989).  (ECF No. 58 at 12.)  The District Court’s summary 
judgment opinion reflects a clear understanding of the circumstances that would prove 
relevant if it found that Riley used force.  The fact that the District Court did not discuss 
those circumstances or otherwise apply the Graham factors after trial makes it abundantly 
clear that it found that Riley did not use force at all.  That finding was not clearly 
erroneous, and we reject Ware’s other challenges to the District Court’s judgment on this 
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claim for the reasons summarized in the margin.5 
 
B.     Ware’s Remaining Arguments 
 Ware’s remaining claims of pre-trial and trial error lack merit as well.  Ware 
argues that the District Court erred in denying his motion for summary judgment, but a 
party cannot challenge the denial of summary judgment after a trial on the merits because 
the denial of summary judgment remains interlocutory and the trial record supersedes the 
summary judgment record.  See Ortiz v. Jordan, 562 U.S. 180, ___, 131 S. Ct. 884, 888-
89 (2011).   
 Ware also raises various challenges to the District Court’s exercise of discretion 
over matters of discovery and evidence.  He argues, for example, that the District Court 
abused its discretion in quashing subpoenas he served on the City of Wilmington and that 
its ruling effectively prevented him from obtaining any discovery regarding Riley and 
                                                 
5 Ware faults the District Court for failing to apply the Graham factors, but, as just 
discussed, it was not necessary for the District Court to do so in light of its finding that 
Riley did not use force in the first place.  Ware also faults the District Court’s reliance on 
the lack of a physical injury and medical treatment, but the District Court did not err in 
seeking some objective corroboration of Ware’s claim.  Ware argues that defendants laid 
no foundation for Riley’s testimony that use of force generally triggers an investigation, 
but Riley clearly was testifying from his own experience as a police officer.  Ware also 
argues that the District Court imposed an administrative exhaustion requirement on this 
claim by relying on the fact that he did not file a written complaint with the police 
department, but the District Court instead merely found the lack of such a complaint 
relevant to Ware’s claim on the merits.  The District Court also entered judgment against 
Ware on his related supplemental claim of assault under state law, but Ware has not 
challenged that ruling on appeal and we deem the supplemental claim waived. 
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Pfaff.  Ware is mistaken.  On December 22, 2011, the District Court entered an order 
quashing Ware’s third-party subpoenas on the grounds that he could seek the discovery 
requested therein from Riley and Pfaff themselves and that, if  relevant information 
proved not to be under their control, he could serve a third-party subpoena in the future.  
(ECF Nos. 21 & 22.)  The District Court also extended the discovery deadline for over 
four months.  Ware concedes both that he did not serve written discovery on Riley or 
Pfaff (or anyone else) within that time and that he did not do so because he 
misunderstood the deadline’s significance.  The District Court nevertheless permitted him 
to depose both Riley and Pfaff after the deadline.   
 Ware also argues that the District Court abused its discretion in quashing 
discovery and trial subpoenas he served on his landlord, Howard Sudler.  Ware does not 
state what information or testimony he sought from Sudler or how it would have been 
relevant to his claims, however, and we discern no conceivable relevance because Sudler 
did not witness the incident in question and the District Court’s rulings did not turn on 
any factual dispute as to which he could have testified. 
 Ware also faults the District Court’s rulings regarding his alleged video recording 
of the incident.  During Ware’s deposition, he testified that he had a video recording of 
the incident because he heard the officers coming and set up a camera phone to record the 
encounter before they entered his bedroom.  Ware later claimed that he could not retrieve 
the recording because his phone is inoperable.  After Ware refused to produce a copy of 
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the recording or his phone for inspection, defendants filed a motion to dismiss his 
complaint as a sanction.   
 The District Court denied that motion, but it later entered an order providing that 
“[h]aving failed to produce the alleged video recording during discovery, plaintiff shall 
not be permitted to refer to it or otherwise use it at trial.”  (ECF No. 73.)  Ware abided by 
that order during his direct testimony.  On cross-examination, the District Court permitted 
defense counsel (over Ware’s objection) to impeach him with his deposition testimony 
that he got out of bed to activate the camera phone because he heard the officers coming 
but then remained naked and got back into bed instead of taking that opportunity to 
clothe himself.  (ECF No. 94, N.T. 11/20/13, at 113-17.) 
 Ware argues that it was unfairly prejudicial for the District Court to preclude him 
from offering evidence of the recording but then to permit defendants to impeach him 
with his testimony that he had activated a camera phone.  We disagree.  The District 
Court acted well within its discretion in precluding Ware from introducing evidence of 
the alleged recording, and the District Court did so to protect the defendants in light of 
Ware’s discovery violations, not to limit their ability to impeach him.   
 The final issue we address is Ware’s argument that the District Court erred in its 
treatment of his four witnesses—i.e., Isaac Vaughn, Christopher Brown, Officer Gula, 
and Naasih Faheen.  Ware argues that the District Court failed to mention the testimony 
of Vaughn, Brown and Faheen, but we have reviewed these witnesses’ testimony (ECF 
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No. 94, N.T. 11/20/13, at 20-46, 64-83) and it was unnecessary for the District Court to 
refer to it because they did not witness the incident in question and their testimony was 
not directly relevant to any of the issues discussed above.  Ware also argues that the 
District Court should have disregarded Officer Gula’s testimony that he did not recall the 
incident and should have found instead that Gula guarded the front door while Riley and 
Pfaff questioned Ware in his room.  But Ware neither specifies the significance of that 
alleged fact nor cites any record evidence making the District Court’s acceptance of 
Gula’s testimony clearly erroneous, and we have found none.  Ware’s remaining 
arguments suffer from similar deficiencies and, having reviewed all of them in light of 
the record, we conclude that they do not require further discussion. 
 
 
III. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.  
Ware’s motion to file an untimely and overlength brief is granted.6 
                                                 
6 Ware, who is a relatively sophisticated litigant by pro se standards, obtained an 
extension of time to file his opening brief but then submitted it twelve days after the 
extended deadline.  We do not condone that delay or the fact that Ware has not even 
attempted to explain it.  In this instance, however, we exercise our discretion to decide 
this appeal on the merits because defendants did not file a motion to dismiss the appeal in 
lieu of their brief on the merits and the appeal is now fully briefed. 
